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Introduction
At this point, the historical case studies presented in the preceding chapters, 
which span the geographic and chronological spread of Late Antiquity from the 
“peace” of Constantine to the shock waves of the invasions and occupations of 
the seventh century CE, have established the pervasiveness of the rhetoric of 
persecution in Christian and Manichaean circles in Late Antiquity. In the course 
of these studies, certain observations have emerged. Some of the authors of the 
chapters have discussed individual – and often local – conditions that encouraged 
or gave rise to persecution discourse. Many have attributed its purpose to identity 
formation. Some have questioned the relationship between objective historical 
conditions (reality) and reported violence, harassment, or coercion (rhetoric). 
That allegations of religious persecution are intended to delegitimize imperial 
or state prosecution against what is an objectively illegitimate political act – for 
example, treason – has been adduced as a possible motive. The slippage between 
prosecution and persecution, a number of the authors argue, is in the eye of the 
beholder. What I seek to do in the present chapter is to take these observations and 
interrogate them further. Why do certain themes and language recur? What are 
the conditions that encourage this type of discourse? Is there a direct relationship 
between these conditions and the production of new martyr narratives? What is 
the motive of those who produce persecution discourse? And, is there a direct 
relationship between the motive or intent of the authors and the likely effect on 
their intended audiences? These and other questions will be engaged with in this 
chapter in an attempt to understand why the rhetoric of persecution is so pervasive 
among Christians and Manichaeans in Late Antiquity, why we see the production 
of martyr narratives or apocalyptic increase in certain locations and at certain 
times, and what role persecution narratives play – as opposed to the role they are 
intended to play – in the communities in which they are promulgated. Finally, 
with regard to the vexed question of the relationship between rhetoric and reality, 
I will offer some tentative conclusions regarding what these narratives most likely 
tell us about the time at which they were generated or subsequently embellished 
and recirculated. I end on this note because a question of concern in recent years 
has been whether as scholars, in acknowledging and deconstructing the discourse 
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318 Wendy Mayer 
of religiously motivated violence, we have become so suspicious of the reported 
violence that we now view it entirely as constructed and thus, rightly or wrongly, 
deny it any validity.1
The engagement with these questions will proceed in three parts. Firstly, I 
will adduce two studies that bracket the period that is the subject of this book – 
one from early Islamic Egypt, one from fourth-century North Africa – that offer 
insights concerning persecution discourse that I consider helpful. Secondly, I will 
introduce a number of theories from social and cognitive psychology – in par-
ticular, from the domain of moral psychology – that help to explain why certain 
language and themes keep recurring across different cultures and regions in Late 
Antiquity. This section will – necessarily, in brief – cover a number of topics: 
ideological narratives; sacred values and devoted actors; social–functional moral 
intuitions; and moral “commonsense,” feedback loops, and addiction to differ-
ence. What I will argue here is that the features common to persecution rhetoric 
are common precisely because of how the rhetoric of persecution taps into and 
activates parts of the human brain that transcend culture, even though the specific 
narrative framing might be culturally encoded. Thirdly, and finally, I will consider 
what this has to say about when and why persecution rhetoric emerges within a 
social group, with particular reference to the intended as well as the actual effect 
of that rhetoric on its audience.
Coming full circle in Africa
In 2006 Arietta Papaconstantinou published an insightful article in which she 
highlighted the emergence in non-Chalcedonian circles in Egypt in the sev-
enth and eighth centuries of an entirely new cycle of martyr stories all of which 
claimed that the deaths had taken place under the Roman emperor Diocletian.2 
These hagiographies contain “extravagant” descriptions of literally unbelievable 
torture and suffering, in which the martyrs display suprahuman fortitude and are 
revived from death by supernatural means so that their suffering and torture can be 
extended.3 Included among these stories is an indigenizing legend of Diocletian 
himself, which tells how he was born into an Egyptian Christian family, became 
a soldier for the Persian campaign under Numerius, fell in love with and married 
the emperor’s daughter at Antioch, succeeded as emperor, rejected Christianity 
(apostatized), and began to persecute Christians.4 As Papaconstantinou goes on 
to explain, these narratives were produced in the context of the Arab conquest 
of Egypt in 641, when Chalcedonian Christianity was the state church benefiting 
from imperial support, while the non-Chalcedonian church had its own patriarch 
and rival parallel network of bishoprics, albeit largely resident in regional mon-
asteries. Both churches had, since 451, been engaged in mutual polemic, with 
production increasing toward the end of the sixth century. Under Arab rule the 
two churches benefited from “even-handed indifference.” What we see in these 
narratives and in other texts produced in the early centuries of Arab rule – later 
entrenched in the Coptic church histories of the tenth and eleventh centuries – she 
argues, is “the Egyptian Monophysite (or non-Chalcedonian) Church searching 
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for a new identity and a new legitimacy. In this quest it was important to that 
Church to mark its indigenous origin.”5
The ideological narrative that emerged within non-Chalcedonian circles in this 
climate, Papaconstantinou outlines as follows:
the doctrinal divisions of Egyptian Christianity were a threat to the unity – 
indeed to the survival – of a community that was now no longer dominant. 
Drawing from the distinction between Christianity and Islam, John of Nikiu 
and George the Archdeacon introduced an ethnic and territorial element in 
what until then was a purely religious division: the Chalcedonians were iden-
tified with the Romans [the Byzantines, especially the emperor Heraclius], 
and the Monophysites with the local Egyptians. As the story goes, the Romans 
left the country after their defeat, and the Christian community that remained 
in Egypt had a common ethnic origin, a privileged position in the landscape, 
and a common history of suffering at the hands of foreigners. […] In a paral-
lel development, the Romans were gradually constructed as the imperial, for-
eign oppressors, whose theology was heretical and whose faith was corrupt. 
This was instrumental in bringing out more vividly the idea of an orthodox, 
local, suffering community.6
It is in this context that the martyr literature contributed, as she goes on to argue, 
to the construction of
a new foundational myth for the Coptic Church. To completely appropri-
ate the persecution epos, the Egyptian Christian community also needed to 
appropriate all the key figures of the pre-Constantinian Church of the Martyrs. 
The Great Persecution of Diocletian acquired the status of a founding event.
[…] All these texts and legends point in the same direction. The post- 
Constantinian Church as a whole claimed to be the direct heir of the persecuted 
Church. The sacrifice of the martyrs was seen as the founding act of the new, 
dominant Christian community. This claim was all the stronger as it had been 
for a time contested by “fundamentalist” groups such as the Melitians, who 
could admittedly lay a better claim to being the Church of the Martyrs, a name 
they posted on the doors of their churches. Likewise, in the hagiographical 
production of the postconquest Monophysite Church, all the central characters 
in this story of martyrdom and persecution were once again – and even more 
radically – co-opted, so that the legendary history of the origins of the Coptic 
Church became entirely indigenous. By making the persecutor Diocletian an 
Egyptian, […] the Coptic community in Islamic Egypt created its own narra-
tive of salvation, a narrative that was entirely independent and self-sufficient.7
In this example, that postdates the case studies presented in this volume, we see 
the maturation – and continuing potency8 – of the discourse that these case studies 
trace: the claim to be heirs of Roman persecution.
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I have adduced Papaconstantinou’s tracing and analysis of the phenomenon 
in early Islamic Egypt at length because of the motives, conditions for, and char-
acteristics of the production of persecution discourse toward which her study 
points, many of which are held in common with those brought out in the case 
studies presented in this volume. The discourse is, for instance, concerned with 
boundary-setting and identity-formation. It is concerned with legitimizing one’s 
own non-dominant Christian faction and persuading an audience of that fac-
tion’s supremacy by delegitimizing a rival Christian faction. It is associated with 
increased/renewed production of martyr narratives, which have a local associa-
tion. It is driven in part by a concern for presenting one’s religion as unified in 
a time when there is diversity. It is associated with a discourse of heterodoxy 
and orthodoxy. It is produced at a time when there is protracted interfactional 
(intra-Christian) dispute and in the wake of heightened mutual polemic. Yet it 
arises at a time when there is little or no objective state coercion, harassment, or 
persecution. Where the opposing faction was previously imperially endorsed and 
controlled episcopal cities, both factions are, in essence, now placed on an equal 
footing under the governance of a foreign political power that brings with it both 
a similar and distinctively different competing religion. In terms of its character-
istic features, the discourse portrays its proponents as a persecuted people, and its 
opponents (Chalcedonians) as state-endorsed (imperial), oppressive, and hereti-
cal. It is the non-Chalcedonians who keep the pure faith (are orthodox), for which 
they suffer, and from which they never deviate in their suffering.9 What is perhaps 
unique in the martyr narratives produced in this period is that they look all the way 
back to – and tell stories of eyewitnesses to and victims of – the final pagan perse-
cution; the persecution that, according to Lactantius, gave birth to the triumph of 
Christianity.10 This discursive strategy is prompted by the fact that Chalcedonian 
Christianity too could – and did – claim descent from the “church of the mar-
tyrs.” In order to wrest that title from them, the non-Chalcedonian (Coptic) lit-
erature under Arab rule looked back to what was now mythologized as a golden 
age of (unified, orthodox) Christianity – the period that stretched from the Great 
Persecution to the Council of Chalcedon.11 In this respect, the rhetoric of persecu-
tion had matured as a discourse that could function independently of local reality 
and that could gloss over centuries of Christian disunity. It had come full circle.
The Coptic discourse of early Islamic Egypt at the same time highlights the 
dynamism of persecution rhetoric – a dynamism that has emerged in the case 
studies that precede this chapter. Where Christian communities of the seventh 
century elsewhere sought to explain the defeat of the “Romans” as a consequence 
of sin and a sign of divine disfavor, resulting in the production of apocalyptic 
discourse, as discussed in Chapter 15 by Strickler, in Egypt the non-Chalcedonian 
response was to distance themselves from the Roman defeat by identifying them-
selves as a group apart and appealing to the golden age of the martyrs as their 
inheritance. They did this through portraying themselves as a suffering church via 
the production of a significant number of new martyr narratives. The production 
of either or both apocalyptic literature and martyr stories can go hand in hand with 
the emergence of persecution rhetoric, as we have seen in Shepardson’s chapter 
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on John of Ephesus (Chapter 14), in Morehouse’s on Julian (Chapter 3), and in 
Digeser’s chapter on Lactantius (Chapter 2). In other cases, as per Chapter 11 by 
Lester on sixth-century Iberia, accusations of persecution can fail to occur when 
historical circumstances might be expected to give rise to them, only later to be 
retrojected. A second very recent case study from Africa, this time from the very 
beginnings of the time period covered, is in these respects instructive.
Exploring the phenomenon from the perspectives of identity formation and 
trauma memory Jonathan Conant has recently revisited the question of the rela-
tionship between the real impact of the Diocletian persecution in North Africa 
and the claims North Africans subsequently made about it.12 A first key point that 
Conant makes is the centrality of the memory of the conflict within North African 
Christianity. As he puts it, North Africans used the Great Persecution as an expla-
nation for why their society “was so riven by religious violence.” Stories of per-
secution and martyrdom sustained sectarian rivalry: “in succeeding generations 
North Africans would construct narratives of the betrayal of Christians by other 
Christians in the course of this persecution: acts of primordial evil that paralleled 
Judas’ betrayal of Jesus.”13 This ideological narrative of good and evil, exempli-
fied in the betrayal of Christians by other Christians – Conant attributes its ori-
gin to Optatus and Augustine14 – anticipates the later narrative framing in Egypt 
of Diocletian himself as a “sort of Judas Iscariot.”15 And yet, as Conant points 
out, during the persecution in Africa there appears to have been little violence 
against persons, coercion being focused on the handing over of inanimate objects 
(scriptures, liturgical objects, church property) and “the naming of names.” In this 
respect coercion was not widespread across the Christian community, since the 
legislation applied mostly to clergy and church leaders, many of whom appear 
to have complied.16 What the persecution did produce, he argues, was a sense of 
vulnerability and hypervigilance on the part of Christians in the decades that fol-
lowed. In the context of survivors whose family members had been named,
storytelling provided a way of working through a past that was real and that 
mattered. The few early stories that we are still able to hear strikingly focus on 
the twin themes of self-justification and the displacement of blame onto oth-
ers. […] Critically, though, rhetorical strategies like these relied on a broader 
Christian discourse already dominant in Africa by the end of the first decade 
of the fourth century that displaced feelings of anger and aggression away 
from the actual perpetrators of the persecution – the emperors, the imperial 
administration, and the local municipal authorities – and rationalised project-
ing them instead onto fellow victims of the anti-Christian edict of 303 […].17
The proditor and traditor language prevalent in African debates of the fourth 
and fifth centuries about the appropriate response to persecution Conant sees as 
symptomatic of a subsequent hardening in attitudes toward, and a dynamic shift 
in, the definition of betrayal.
A second point that Conant makes concerns the production, reworking, and 
annual retelling in Africa of the acts of martyrs. Accusations of betrayal entwined, 
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he observes, with a corresponding search for (loyal) heroes. Dynamic change 
occurred in both instances. Just as the definition of betrayal shifted over time, mar-
tyr acta were living texts that continued to be elaborated, “successively reworked 
over time in order to suit the needs of the communities that used them.”18 As 
Conant points out,
generally speaking at least two trends of this reworking are particularly striking, 
both of which were probably already at play in the fourth century. First, narra-
tives about the past were stripped bare – and in some cases built up again – to 
emphasise Christianity per se as a source both of victimisation in the saeculum 
and of transcendent spiritual strength for its adherents. Second, as these stories 
about the saints were distilled down to their essence, the reality that they sought 
to convey about the past was fundamentally emotional rather than historical. 
[…] It seems to have mattered deeply to those who curated the memory of the 
persecution that they bear witness not just to the sacrifice of those who had been 
executed by the imperial authorities, but also that they make their audiences feel 
the sense of anxiety that had accompanied actively self-identifying as Christian 
at the time. As the events of the persecution dimmed in living memory, some 
Christian authors seem to have become increasingly insistent on this point.19
This factor Conant sees as instrumental in the introduction of increasingly lurid 
details into martyr acts.20 His observations prompt us to ask whether this same 
concern for producing emotional identification in the listener accounts for the 
production of new martyr stories in different contexts in successive centuries, on 
the one hand, and the extravagant hyperrealism of the martyr stories produced in 
early Islamic Egypt, on the other. Do his observations hold true only for the first 
generations after a perceived experience of trauma?
Regardless of the answer to this last question, Conant’s observations again 
tap into common themes and observations that have emerged from the studies 
presented in preceding chapters. That the rhetoric of persecution is engaged with 
the “curation of social memory” is a telling point. In this respect, as we have seen 
in many of the chapters, it is about a group’s way of constructing and “remem-
bering” its past, both immediate and more distant. It is, as Conant points out, 
about group self-identification, produced by an anxiety about compromise or 
compliance with an external other, resulting in an emphasis on insider loyalty 
and betrayal. It is about telling and retelling stories of heroes and traitors that 
promote self-justification and keep the constructed “memory” emotionally alive 
and effective. Ultimately, the curation of social memory is dynamic, with shifts 
in definitions and in the narrative itself over time. Interestingly the concern with 
self-justification over having submitted instead of resisted, that resulted in North 
Africa in retrospective narratives of loyal clerics having tricked authorities and 
only deceptively complied,21 reemerges, for example, in sixth-century Iberia in 
claims that Leovigild was deceptive in his praying at the tombs of Nicene mar-
tyrs and that Nicene clergy were seduced into Arian conversion.22 There Lester 
observes, too, how the discourse shifted over time.
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Cognition, social groups, and the rhetoric of persecution
On the surface, the rhetoric of persecution could be said to be about power and 
resistance to power in order to claim power or freedom for oneself.23 It occurs 
when power is viewed by those subject to it as unjust.24 We see variations on 
this assessment expressed in a number of the chapters here, made explicit by 
Falcasantos when she asserts:
I take as my starting point the position that any accusation of persecution 
arises first and foremost from coercive acts seen to limit the agency or rights 
of its victims while demonstrating or increasing the status, power, or agency 
of its perpetrators.25 
This starting point assumes that real power is exerted and that persecution rheto-
ric is triggered by actual actions – that is, that there is some objective reality, 
however it might be interpreted, that sits beneath the text. One entailment of this 
position is to locate the origin of persecution discourse in the slippage between 
prosecution and persecution.26 Associated with this cluster of ideas is the con-
cept of the “weaponization” of persecution discourse, which is wielded by one 
religious group against another or against imperial or regal authority. Associated 
with power, too, is the pervasive discussion in the preceding chapters of legitima-
tion and delegitimation. A Foucauldian analysis would produce useful insights in 
these respects.
At the same time, in their analyses of their particular case studies, a number 
of the authors in this book appeal to narrative framing.27 Others have introduced 
theories from memory studies, including the memory of trauma and the social 
performance of memory.28 In addition to adducing trauma memory and the cura-
tion of social memory, for his part Conant, as discussed earlier, sees persecution 
discourse per se as engaged in displacing emotions like anger or guilt, and martyr 
narratives in particular as playing a role in engaging empathy and stirring up 
emotions. All of these observations point us to the link between language – in 
particular, the stories we tell ourselves – emotions, and cognition. In analyzing 
what persecution rhetoric does, why it develops, and why it is so pervasive, the 
role of memory – in terms of what is remembered and suppressed and in terms 
of its production, curation, and performance – deserves a detailed study of its 
own. For the remainder of this chapter, however, I will set detailed exploration 
of memory and power aside, leaving those analyses for future studies, and turn 
rather to the fields of social and cognitive psychology for their potential to pro-
duce yet another set of insights about what triggers persecution discourse and 
what it does to the community that embraces it or in which it is promulgated. In 
particular, when combined, theories from these and related fields take us beyond 
concerns about power that might operate at the conscious (rational) level to sug-
gest that preconscious (prerational) affective mechanisms – that can present to 
the twenty-first-century observer or to opponents at the time as irrational – also 
play a significant role.
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Moral intuitions, sacred values, and devoted actors
A common discursive thread observed across the case studies is that the com-
munity that self-identifies as persecuted perceives itself as battling a specific evil. 
At its extreme, in the ensuing narrative the perceived enemy becomes framed as 
Satan or the Antichrist.29 As the narrative develops, the identified evil is portrayed 
as seeking to corrupt or destroy what the group holds sacred (the true faith). There 
is no gray. Everything is black and white (Manichaean dualism). Language of 
purity (orthodoxy) and corruption (heterodoxy) is a significant feature. The pure 
followers (martyrs) are those who, when battling the evil, even to the point of 
death, are unwavering in their faith and do not deviate from the true path. In 
understanding why at their core the narratives are so remarkably consistent across 
so many different cultures, regions, and political settings in Late Antiquity, the 
work of Jesse Graham and Jonathan Haidt concerning moral intuitions and sacred 
values, and of Scott Atran concerning devoted actors contribute explanatory mod-
els that may prove helpful.30
In order to appreciate the value of their contribution, some groundwork needs 
to be laid first concerning how moral cognition works in the brain, the agency of 
moral intuitions in moral judgments, and the role of social–functional moral intui-
tions in how groups cohere.31 Further, in order to bring together moral cognition 
and religion and its discourse of persecution in this particular way, a number of 
suppositions are required:
 1. A religious movement or sect is a social group.
 2. Religious groups are not special. Individuals bind together to form religious 
groups and religious groups split into sects or come into conflict with other 
religious groups on the basis of the same mechanisms that cause all social 
groups to bind, split or generate conflict.
 3. It is not religion per se, but morality that is the primary force that binds social 
groups together.32 Morality sits beneath and shapes politics, economics, and 
religion.33
 4. Morality in this sense is distinct from ethics or religious values. It is not about 
what we should or should not do (determining the morally correct approach 
to a situation or what is ideally good, i.e., aspirant moral values), but social–
functional values, that is, about the unconscious values and moral judgments 
that inform our everyday actions and behavior (operant moral values).
These suppositions are all open to contestation. Taken together, however, they 
build, I argue, a strong foundation for explaining how persecution and martyr nar-
ratives emerge in response to a particular perceived threat in the ways that they 
do, and why those narratives are common in and across Late Antiquity regardless 
of the degree to which one can quantify objective persecution.
Building on Durkheim’s and Weber’s ideas of community, authority, and 
sacredness, Graham and Haidt have spent the past decade developing explanatory 
theories concerning the “motives and motivated reasoning of partisans,”34 key 
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among them the premise that groups organize and facilitate mutual cooperation 
on the basis of a surprisingly small number of moral foundations.35 These founda-
tions are the functional basis on which social groups overcome individual selfish-
ness and cooperate – hence the label “social–functional” – and are distinct from 
the aspirational values (the ethics or moral code) that are consciously held up by a 
particular social group as the set of ideals according to which an individual should 
live her or his life. The degree of emphasis individual groups place on each of 
the moral foundations helps to explain, these scholars argue, “how and why the 
moral domain varies across cultures.”36 The point they make, however, is that the 
foundations themselves are not variable but are cross-cultural, and social groups 
operate on the basis of all of the five foundations regardless of their particular 
emphasis.37 While the concern of these scholars is with modern to postmodern 
societies, these same foundations can be demonstrated to shape and thus help to 
explain premodern societies and the social groups operative within them.38
We can make this claim in part because moral judgment, according to the cur-
rent consensus, is cognitive and operates at the level of intuition.39 Since the pro-
cesses in evolution are slow and the human brain of the third and the twenty-first 
centuries are both essentially cognitively modern,40 it is reasonable to suppose that 
such basic ways of thinking are not just cross-cultural but also transhistorical. In 
fact, when it comes to the brain and moral cognition by 2010 there was already 
more or less consensus regarding four basic findings:
 1. morality is largely universal, that is, cross-cultural;
 2. there are, however, many moral judgments that do not to fall into a universal 
category and that appear to be influenced by local culture and learning;
 3. all moral decision processes resulting in behaviors, regardless of category, 
are carried out before conscious awareness of them (they result from a micro-
second, intuitive response); and
 4. there is a special device (“the interpreter”), usually located in the brain’s 
left hemisphere, that seeks to understand the rationale behind the pattern of 
behavior in others and/or oneself.41
Haidt calls the latter two processes “the emotional dog and its rational tail.”42 That 
is, we automatically and without exception make moral decisions or judgments 
at the preconscious level and rationalize them after the fact. The most important 
entailment of this discovery is that, while the reasons we give for an action may 
rationalize a gut response, the rationalization and the moral intuition are not logi-
cally consequential.43 Understanding this helps to explain why the discourse and/
or behavior of partisan religious groups can at times appear to be inconsistent with 
the espoused moral code.44
The potential utility of this body of research becomes clearer when we exam-
ine the five moral intuitions or foundations that have thus far been discovered. 
Extracted from the adaptive challenges of social life discussed by evolutionary 
psychologists, Moral Foundations Theory seeks “to identify the best candidates 
for […] the universal cognitive modules upon which cultures construct moral 
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matrices.”45 The key adaptive challenges from which they evolved are defined as: 
“caring for vulnerable children”; “forming partnerships with non-kin to reap the 
benefits of reciprocity”; “forming coalitions to compete with other coalitions”; 
“negotiating status hierarchies”; and “keeping oneself and one’s kin free from 
parasites and pathogens, which spread quickly when people live in close prox-
imity.”46 Although there has been some variation in the labeling as the theory 
has progressed,47 the five foundations identified are care/harm; fairness/cheating; 
loyalty/betrayal; authority/subversion; and sanctity/degradation. With respect 
to persecution discourse, we can immediately see that language of loyalty and 
betrayal, fairness and cheating (justice/injustice), and sanctity and degradation 
(purity/corruption, orthodoxy/heresy) play prominent roles. Each foundation is 
associated with a set of original triggers, characteristic emotions, and relevant vir-
tues.48 The characteristic emotions are compassion (care/harm); anger, gratitude, 
guilt (fairness/cheating); group pride, rage at traitors (loyalty/betrayal); respect, 
fear (authority/subversion); and disgust (sanctity/degradation). These character-
istic emotions are of particular interest in that they correlate with the automatic, 
intuitive response (the gut moral judgment) that occurs before rationalization. 
Rationalization then usually occurs within the conceptual framework of the cor-
responding moral foundation.49 Here we can immediately think of Conant’s argu-
ment that the retrospective shift in the definition of persecution that took place 
in Donatist and Catholic circles in North Africa was concerned with working 
out feelings of anger and guilt. That the associated narratives that emerged were 
focused on loyalty and betrayal is, as we shall see, significant.
What Haidt and his colleagues found in their experiments is that progressives 
placed strong emphasis on the first two foundations (care/harm and fairness/
cheating), whereas conservatives placed more equal emphasis on all five.50 This 
led Haidt to propose “that there are two common ways that cultures suppress 
and regulate selfishness, two visions of what society is and how it ought to work 
[…] the contractual approach and the beehive approach.”51 In the contractual (= 
progressive) approach the individual is the fundamental unit of value; in the hive 
(= conservative) approach, it is the group and its territory. This model further led 
Haidt to describe care/harm and fairness/cheating as individualizing foundations, 
in that they generate virtues and practices that protect individuals from each other 
and allow them to live in harmony as autonomous agents who can focus on their 
own goals; and loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation 
as binding foundations, because the virtues, practices, and institutions they gener-
ate function to bind people together into hierarchically organized interdependent 
social groups that try to regulate the daily lives and personal habits of their mem-
bers.52 It should be stressed that neither approach to social cohesion is good or bad 
in itself. Both have pro- and antisocial entailments. These insights are particu-
larly useful when brought into dialogue with the findings from the extensive and 
detailed analysis of fundamentalist religious movements undertaken by Martin 
Marty and Scott Appleby in the 1990s.53 This is not to say that persecution narra-
tives are necessarily fundamentalist. Some dovetail more neatly with fundamen-
talism than others. Most, however, share certain characteristics. Fundamentalist 
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movements, according to the findings of the project, “are by definition, militant, 
mobilized, defensive” and reactionary.54 Fundamentalist religious movements 
mobilize and fight, whether ideologically or through action, in response to a per-
ceived danger. When we contemplate the case studies presented here all of this 
sounds remarkably familiar. What I will argue in what follows is that anxiety 
or fear about the loss of something held sacred strengthens the hivist intuitions. 
It is not surprising, then, that, in response to a perceived threat, in persecution 
discourse we see a tendency toward fundamentalist characteristics and strong 
emphasis on the binding moral foundations (loyalty, authority, sanctity = purity). 
In the case of persecution rhetoric authority expresses in specific creeds, which 
are deemed by a particular partisan group to be sacred.
A significant finding of Moral Foundations research is that groups that place 
strong emphasis on either set may work toward the same prosocial goals, but, as a 
result of the different moral foundations that drive the group, disagree strongly on 
the best way to achieve them. This finding is corroborated by the work of another 
moral psychologist, Joshua Greene, who uses the analogy of moral tribes to make 
the case that the same values that favor and foster intragroup cooperation can 
prove problematic when one group encounters another.55 The intergroup conflict 
that can result he labels “the tragedy of commonsense morality.” To paraphrase 
his summary of how this works: groups share some core values; each group’s 
philosophy is woven into its daily life; each group has its own version of moral 
common sense; they fight, not because they are immoral, but because when they 
come into competition, they view the contested ground from very different moral 
perspectives.56 Haidt labels this same phenomenon as “morality binds and blinds,” 
concluding: “[Morality] binds us into ideological teams that fight each other as 
though the fate of the world depended on our side winning each battle. It blinds us 
to the fact that each team is composed of good people who have something impor-
tant to say.”57 What this research collectively suggests is that, when we look at the 
phenomenon of the rhetoric of persecution, we should view those who self-iden-
tify in this way not as religious actors but as moral actors, driven intuitively by a 
particular set of values. This approach explains why there are such commonalities 
in the phenomenon across the longue durée of Late Antiquity and into Christian 
and para-Christian discourse under Islam, since it moves us beyond cultural con-
structs of religion to something that is, from a cognitive point of view, genuinely 
cross-cultural in that it is a common driver in the shaping of culturally constructed 
frames or points of view. It also helps to explain why the concepts persecution/
prosecution, justice/injustice, purity/impurity, orthodoxy/heresy, heroes/villains, 
and persecutor/victim tend, in the context of persecution discourse, to be con-
ceived of as sharply defined binaries and why their interpretation, as the authors 
of so many of these chapters argue, is in the eye of the beholder. Equally impor-
tant, acknowledgement of the existence of moral intuitions and the moral com-
monsense constructed on the basis of them encourages us to view the perspective 
of those who self-identify as persecuted, as Fournier argues in the introduction 
(Chapter 1), as simultaneously a rhetorical construct and a worldview that, while 
extreme, is nonetheless authentic.
328 Wendy Mayer 
Yet another area in which moral psychology research can contribute is in the 
area of ideological narratives. In the course of their work on moral foundations, 
Graham and Haidt identified a particular ideological narrative founded on the five 
moral intuitions that is instrumental in producing terrorist acts and intergroup vio-
lence.58 Building on the work of other scholars on “sacredness,” they argued for 
the inclusion of a psychology of sacredness in the “evolved psychological mecha-
nisms” that are part of moral systems.59 For Graham and Haidt sacred values are
moral concerns imbued with value far beyond practical utilities or self-inter-
est. […] [P]eople, things and ideas […] can become sacralized because they 
are linked to these sacred values. And just as something is seen as worthy of 
ultimate protection, there is a vision of what it must be protected from: This 
is a vision of evil.60 
The ideological narrative that results from this process, they argue, is simple, 
effective at group binding, and encourages militant action.
[W]hen people join together to pursue political projects – from the demand 
for civil rights to violent revolution to genocide – they must share a common 
story, one that they accept as true without having authored it. Ideological 
narratives, then, by their very nature, are always stories about good and evil. 
They identify heroes and villains, they explain how the villains got the upper 
hand, and they lay out or justify the means by which – if we can just come 
together and fight hard enough – we can vanquish the villains and return the 
world to its balanced or proper state.61
Once again there is a remarkable consonance between persecution discourse 
and this ideological narrative. Persecution narratives have at their center heroes 
(dissident clergy, orthodox emperors/kings, and martyrs) and villains (heretical 
emperors/kings and heretical/apostate clergy and laity). Their focus is on an evil 
(heresy) against which the world needs to be protected. Orthodoxy is held up as 
sacred. The implicit message is that heresy is the source of all the evils in the 
world and that it urgently needs to be vanquished in order to restore the world to 
its proper (orthodox) state. That proper or balanced state is, in the eyes of those 
who construct these ideological narratives, pure, unmixed, and uncorrupted.
When we turn to explaining the prominence of martyr narratives in association 
with persecution discourse, as well as stories of force-feeding of heretical eucha-
rists or forced baptism,62 the work of the anthropologist Scott Atran on “devoted 
actors” is highly suggestive. Atran, interested in extreme behaviors that, in rational 
terms, are out of proportion to prospects of success,63 and in why certain political 
disputes become intractable, takes the work of the Moral Foundations theorists 
one step further to talk about certain moral values as “sacred values” that are inti-
mately linked to personal and group identity. As he expresses it:
while the term “sacred values” intuitively denotes religious belief, in what 
follows, sacred values refer to any preferences regarding objects, beliefs, or 
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practices that people treat as both incompatible or nonfungible with profane 
issues or economic goods, as when land or law becomes holy or hallowed 
and as inseparable from people’s conception of “self” and of “who we are.”64
For understanding what motivates voluntary martyrs (modern suicide bombers) in 
particular, Atran’s summary of his findings regarding the entailments of “sincere 
attachment to sacred values” in multiple cultures and geopolitical hotspots across 
the contemporary world, is instructive:
(1) commitment to a rule-bound logic of moral appropriateness to do what 
is morally right no matter the likely risks or rewards rather than following a 
utilitarian calculus of costs and consequences […]; (2) immunity to material 
trade-offs coupled with a “backfire effect” where offers of incentives or disin-
centives to give up sacred values heighten refusal to compromise or negotiate 
[…]; (3) resistance to social influence and exit strategies […], which leads 
to unyielding social solidarity and binds genetic strangers to voluntarily sac-
rifice for one another; (4) insensitivity to spatial and temporal discounting, 
where considerations of distant places and people and even far past and future 
events associated with sacred values significantly outweigh concerns with 
here and now […]; and (5) brain-imaging patterns consistent with processing 
obligatory rules rather than weighing costs and benefits and with processing 
perceived violations of such rules as emotionally agitating and resistant to 
social influence […].65
In essence, when sacred values come into play perception of what is right or 
wrong trumps utilitarian considerations (cost-benefit analysis), actors become 
blind to exit strategies and are more willing “to fight and risk serious loss/death 
rather than compromise”; and material incentives or disincentives are likely to be 
viewed as insulting/profane and to make the actors more intransigent.66 Although 
Atran is describing and analyzing real actors across the globe in the present day, 
many of these same characteristics are expressed in the martyr narratives embel-
lished and/or produced in the fourth to eighth centuries. This is particularly the 
case with the ideology of death before compromise. Suffering or dying to defend 
the values that the group holds sacred is, in martyr stories, proof of orthodoxy and 
becomes in itself almost sacred and heroic. If Conant is correct, the martyr stories 
were intended, via their liturgical instantiation and annual retelling, to stimulate 
their audience to identify emotionally with the central actors. Identity with these 
devoted actors, for some listeners, may well have occasioned identification with 
the sacred value/s for which they voluntarily gave up their lives.
In developing his theory of devoted actors further, what Atran adds to the 
insights of the moral psychologists is Fusion theory, taken from the field of 
social psychology. This introduces the idea of the fusing of self-identity with a 
unique collective identity, which is in turn fused with sacred values, providing 
all group members with “a similar sense of significance.”67 This has as much to 
say to the emergence of Christianity and its response to persecution – whether the 
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persecution was real or perceived – as to present-day jihadists and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. As he explains:
In the sweep of cultural evolution, movements that develop psychological 
mechanisms to promote devoted actors are more likely to succeed because 
they exploit evolved psychology (e.g., kin selection) in evolutionarily novel 
ways. The interaction of identity fusion and sacred values seems to be one 
such case, where the psychology of kin selection combines with bonding ritu-
als (e.g., sacred oaths, bayat, to the brotherhood, ikhwaniyah, of jihad and its 
leaders) to inextricably cement individuals to the group via a shared spiritual 
and moral mission.68
These insights are useful for understanding persecution discourse in two additional 
respects. Self-identifying as persecuted is powerful precisely because it serves to 
bind individuals with the same shared (sacred) values into a tightly knit “broth-
erhood.” At the same time, given the importance of bonding rituals for cement-
ing individuals to the group and its mission, we can see why claims of force-fed 
eucharists and forced baptism occur in our narratives. The idea of receiving at the 
hands of heretics these particular rituals, which in late-ancient Christian thought 
on medical–philosophical grounds quite literally bonded Christians to Christ and 
to each other,69 will, on the one hand, have shocked true believers, evoking dis-
gust and, ultimately, anger. Through these rituals, the orthodox individual was, 
these stories tell us, literally ripped away from their own brotherhood and rebound 
to the heterodox community. On the other hand, these stories invoke the martyr 
(devoted actor) narrative. The orthodox have to be force-fed and forced into bap-
tism precisely because, these stories imply, they resisted. Resistance for the true 
faith is a characteristic of martyrdom, which, in the circular logic of persecution 
discourse, is proof of orthodoxy.
Cause and effect
If these theoretical approaches help to explain why certain discursive threads are 
common in the rhetoric of persecution, they also provide a challenge to assump-
tions about that rhetoric’s purpose. A number of the case studies presented in the 
preceding chapters support Falcasantos’ assertion that “accusation of persecution 
arises first and foremost from coercive acts seen to limit the agency or rights of 
its victims.” But this should not always be assumed to be the case. A key finding 
of the Fundamentalism Project that can further be brought into dialogue with the 
research discussed in the previous section concerns what drives the setting of clear 
boundaries as a core fundamentalism characteristic. In the specific case of funda-
mentalist religious movements, boundaries, it is argued, “relate to the challenge 
of keeping the group’s identity in an open and often tempting society.”70 This 
insight challenges us to look not for pervasive religious intolerance as a causal 
factor but rather religious tolerance,71 and helps to explain why we see persecution 
discourse so often expressing concern about apostasy. It also helps to explain why 
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persecution discourse incorporates discursive strategies – for example, claims of 
seduction, trickery, or force – for justifying current or past cooperation. The dan-
ger to which persecution discourse in the centuries after Constantine so often 
responds, as the cases of Julian, Leovigild, the Chalcedonian–non-Chalcedonian 
conflict, and early Islamic Egypt show, is less persecution, objectively defined, 
than a social order that is perceived to be too tolerant or too permissive. That is, 
the conditions in which persecution discourse arises, in these instances, are pre-
cisely the opposite of what the discourse itself portrays. In this case, the discourse 
is concerned with the fact that the majority of those religious adherents whom the 
person promulgating the persecution discourse believes should be insiders are 
mixing with those who are corrupt or impure and thus living in the gray zone.72 
Persecution discourse in these instances is about persuading “apostates” that the 
world is black and white, that they are living in a time of moral decay, that their 
particular brand of the religion is at risk of losing its “purity,” and that their apos-
tasy is at fault. At the same time, it is about persuading insiders who have not yet 
apostatized to stand firm and avoid apostasy as an evil. At its most extreme and 
most explicit, we see these ideas expressed once again in apocalyptic narratives.73
There are probably multiple reasons why persecution discourse starts in the 
first place. A minority religious group may perceive itself as oppressed, coerced, 
or harassed for genuine reasons. The author of a persecution narrative may, as 
Fournier suggests, be an “oddball” or an unrepresentative extremist.74 As in the 
case of the non-Chalcedonian church in early Islamic Egypt in the context of pro-
tracted intra-Christian dispute, the entrance of a tolerant third-party state power 
might change the dynamic, resulting in the efflorescence of martyr narratives and 
an appeal to a persecuted past as a means of creating a distinctive legitimating 
history and compellingly new identity. We should not, however, consider cause 
to be the same as effect, just as we should distinguish between the intention of the 
authors of persecution and martyr narratives and the impact of their persecution 
discourse once it was in circulation. As Fournier points out in the introduction, 
these narratives had “serious consequences” in Late Antiquity.75 Conant argues on 
the basis of trauma studies that
[e]motional identification with the experience of the victim can include 
adopting the victim’s sense of helplessness, rage, and grief […]. Thus the 
kind of fear validated by the narratives through which early Christians chose 
to curate their memories of the past could well have helped to reinforce a 
heightened sensitivity to perceived threats – real or imagined – not just in the 
generation of survivors, but in subsequent generations as well, and to validate 
an aggressive response, already displaced from the representatives of the late 
Roman state, and redirected instead toward those who were labelled as in any 
way “Other,” regardless of whether or not they were the cause of any actual 
pain or suffering.76
As he points out, and as the research adduced in the previous section validates, 
ideological narratives are emotional narratives. Emotional narratives, these same 
332 Wendy Mayer 
studies suggest, activate in the brain unconscious prerational responses. When 
they are repeatedly activated through emotional rhetoric the particular neural 
pathways engaged are strengthened as a result.77 This in turn can help to explain 
partisan intractability. Additionally, at a cognitive level persecution narratives 
function as conceptual frames. Conceptual frames, as cognitive linguists argue, 
are simple, automatic, and reflexive.78
Frames are cognitive shortcuts that we use to interpret the world around us, 
to represent the world to others, to reason about it and to make decisions hav-
ing an impact on it. When we categorize a phenomenon in a frame, we give 
meaning to some aspects of what is observed, and at the same time we dis-
count other aspects that are (or become) less relevant. Thus, frames provide 
meaning through a selective process, which filters people’s perceptions and 
concepts, providing a specific perspective on a problem.79
Narratives about good and evil, heroes and villains, persecutors and victims all 
have simple common structures. The problem, when they are activated, is that 
they may not be accurate, they leave out essential details, and it is difficult cogni-
tively to override them. This is why persecution narratives can circulate and even 
“go viral” at times when there is little to no objective persecution. Arguing against 
them using the same language simply strengthens the narrative in the brain of the 
listener.80 They are powerful precisely because they neurally bind emotions to the 
story. We feel fear when the hero is threatened, elated when the heroine wins or 
evil is defeated, and depressed or angry when evil prevails and we identify with 
the victim.81 Stories “with content that evokes high arousal positive (awe [or ela-
tion]) or negative emotions (anger or anxiety),” research shows, are more likely 
to go viral.82 It is in these respects that persecution narratives can take on a life of 
their own, independent of historical reality and of their authors’ intentions.
It is perhaps no accident that the case studies in this volume begin and end 
with apocalyptic discourse. All of the cognitive and neural mechanisms thus far 
described suggest that, under the right conditions, persecution discourse is likely 
to produce a feedback loop that rearouses and heightens emotions and thus esca-
lates intra- and intergroup tensions. In this respect, persecution discourse, even 
if it does not originate in violence, can be productive of violence. Apocalyptic 
discourse generates a particular sense of urgency. “Millennialism and apocalypti-
cism,” Gerhard van den Heever argues,
are imaginaries of the now, symbolic revolts in discourse and conceptuality 
that, at some point, can translate – and in certain contexts does translate – 
into physical revolts. [… Apocalypticism] is a strongly evaluative social 
discourse, embodying strong sentiments of disaffection, dissociation, and 
alienation. It is shaped and intensified by heightened concentration on prac-
tices of purification and dedication to divine purpose as reconstructed and 
reimagined by the affected group through strategies of remythologization 
and re-traditionalization – typical of apocalyptic imaginaries is a conceptual 
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repristination of an earlier period of greater purity, whether this purity be 
ethnic, moral, or ideological.83
For Christians of Late Antiquity, the myth of the Great Persecution as a golden 
age in which orthodox Christians stood firm and died for their faith, initiated by 
Lactantius, continues to resonate throughout all of the case studies. It is a story of 
a pure past that Christians – the right kind of Christians – must constantly strive 
to restore. As a founding myth it predisposes its adherents to think and act in dis-
tinctively adversarial ways. As Van den Heever continues,
An apocalyptic worldview is essentially a violent worldview. The sentiments 
of disaffection projected on to the social context invite a strong emotional 
reaction and channelling of destructive energies towards what is seen as 
undesirable states of things obtaining in the world. Such a worldview is not 
only a social commentary on the state of things, it is also implicitly a call to 
arms to marshal the troops, so to speak, in an attempt to eradicate the grey 
zone, the area of compromises that gets erased under the pressure of societies 
that bifurcate under identity, ideological, and economic stresses and tensions. 
Purification is the “simplification” of the social aggregation.84
What actual impact this discourse had on the communities within which it circu-
lated is difficult to quantify, but it is important that we remain open to the pos-
sibility that the violence reported in persecution narratives was itself, at times, 
generative. When we consider that emotional rhetoric of this kind quite literally 
stimulates the release of neurochemicals in the brain, and align this finding with 
the effect on the brain of constantly deferred gratification – in this instance, an 
ideological war that is never, according to the bulk of the narratives, resolved – we 
can conclude that the Christians of Late Antiquity may well have become attuned 
and addicted to difference.85
Rhetoric and reality
To conclude, I will speculate in brief about what we can now say concerning 
the relationship between persecution rhetoric and historical reality on the basis 
of the aforementioned research and of the case studies presented in this volume. 
Before I do that, it is important to acknowledge that not all of the case studies 
demonstrate all of the characteristics or satisfy all of the conditions described 
earlier. What the case studies remind us of is the diversity and dynamism of per-
secution discourse as a phenomenon in Late Antiquity. That said, there are some 
conclusions that we can draw. Firstly, scholars are right to be suspicious of the 
violence reported in persecution discourse. As these studies show, it is important 
to test rhetorical claims of persecution and violence, wherever possible, against 
the historical record. In this respect, as Conant shows, the adduction of epigraphic 
and archaeological evidence can prove helpful.86 We should be equally concerned 
when all that survives is the persecution rhetoric authored by a single individual 
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or a single religious faction. As the studies by MacDougall, Cohen, and Osequada 
show, a number of distinct groups can claim simultaneously to be victims of per-
secution. Often we gain only hints of the larger context, but when we do, the real-
ity diverges significantly from the rhetorically constructed picture. This, as the 
cognitive research shows, is a natural consequence of ideological narratives and 
their cognitive framing. They are selective and simplified, and certain discursive 
threads are common across them for a reason. When apocalyptic narrative is a 
part of the discourse, we should be particularly wary. Additionally, when con-
cerns with apostasy occur, we should look especially for evidence not of violence 
against the group that claims persecution, but for outsider tolerance and insider 
cooperation and accommodation. In these respects, what these studies suggest is 
a range of possibilities along a spectrum from real, but overstated, violence or 
coercion or harassment to a context of no objective oppression to even-handed 
treatment of all religious groups, including the party that is claiming persecution. 
This much we can say from the perspective of the position of the state toward 
Christian factions and toward their coreligionists, Manichaeans. Teasing out the 
relationship between persecution rhetoric and the behavior of Christian factions 
and their bishops and lesser clergy toward each other requires further deliberation. 
In this latter regard, the research about devoted actors, moral intuitions, moral 
commonsense, and ideological narratives suggests that looking to how groups 
behaved toward each other as a consequence of the circulation of such rhetoric 
rather than to how the rhetoric reflects behavior may prove more fruitful. There 
is much more to be said on that topic. What I have done here is simply to lay a 
foundation for helping us to understand why in so many different contexts across 
Late Antiquity so many groups claimed and continued to claim so consistently to 
be heirs of Roman persecution.
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